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Abstract
This paper examines the business cycle properties of business cycle
models with search frictions and wage bargaining which rely not only on
labor, but also on capital in the production function. In the presence of
capital, the choice of bargaining framework matters, even under perfect
competition and constant returns to scale. In particular, under individual
bargaining, the welfare theorems do not hold, due to a hold-up e⁄ect in
capital and a hiring externality, so that solving a planner￿ s problem is
not su¢ cient. I examine the business cycle properties of the decentralized
model with individual bargaining under alternative calibration strategies.
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2Recently, there has been renewed interest in the business cycle properties of
models with search frictions and wage bargaining. Shimer (2005) shows that
the carefully calibrated baseline model fails to match the data along several
dimensions, while Hall (2005) emphasizes the role that rigid wages can play in
reconciling the model with business cycle facts. These models are characterized
by perfect competition, constant returns to scale and the absence of capital. In
such a setting, the well-known equivalence between one-worker and large ￿rms
holds (Pissarides (2000)) and the distinction between individual and collective
bargaining is not important.
This paper examines the business cycle properties of models which rely not
only on labor, but also on capital in the production function. In the presence
of capital, the choice of bargaining framework does matter, even under perfect
competition and constant returns to scale.
The ￿rst generation of business cycle models with capital and wage bar-
gaining were solved by reliance upon the welfare theorems. Merz (1995) and
Andolfatto (1996) solve the planner￿ s problem, and then show that wages and
prices exist which support the planner￿ s solution as a decentralized recursive
competitive equilibrium. They do not, however, specify the wage-bargaining
mechanism which leads to these wages.
The ￿rst contribution of this paper is to show that individual bargaining
leads to a competitive equilibrium solution which does not correspond to the
planner￿ s problem. The reason is that under individual bargaining, capital is
predetermined at the time of wage bargaining (having been chosen optimally by
the ￿rm in the previous period, as is standard in RBC models) and is subject
to a hold-up problem. The hold-up problem leads to an ine¢ ciently low equi-
librium capital-labor ratio.1 In addition, the ￿rm￿ s optimal capital-labor ratio
is distorted by a hiring externality which leads ￿rms to hire workers beyond the
point at which their employment costs are recouped by their marginal products.
The presence of ine¢ ciencies in the decentralized model invalidates the use
of the second welfare theorem when bargaining is individual. This result has im-
portant consequences for the business cycle properties which can be accounted
for by models with wage bargaining. Since the dominant labor market institu-
tion in the US is individual bargaining2, it seems sensible to focus on individual
bargaining when trying to match business cycle facts of the US economy.
The second contribution of this paper is to examine the business cycle prop-
erties of the decentralized individual bargaining model with capital. The quanti-
tative section of this paper explores alternative calibration strategies and exam-
ines their success at matching key business cycle facts. The crucial parameters
are workers￿bargaining power ￿ and the output elasticities of labor 1 ￿ ￿ and
capital ￿. Workers￿bargaining power controls the deviation of the capital-labor
1Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer (2004) also make the point that hold-up e⁄ects are present in
a model with a predetermined capital stock, constant returns to scale and perfect competition.
However, these authors restrict attention to the steady-state of a partial equilibrium model,
while I study a general equilibrium model with technology shocks.
2Less than 10% of American private sector workers are currently covered by a collective
bargaining agreement, according to CPS data compiled by Hirsch and Macpherson (2003).
3ratio from its e¢ cient value, while both ￿ and ￿ are involved in determining
the factor shares3. In particular, there is a continuum of pairs (￿;￿) which lead
to the observed factor shares in the US economy. Two alternative strategies for
pinning down the (￿;a) pair are explored. I ￿nd values of worker￿ s bargaining
power between 0.15 and 0.28, lower than those traditionally used in the liter-
ature, but more than two to four times higher than the value of 0.06 favored
by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005). For robustness, I also consider values of ￿
equal to 0.72 and 0.50. Finally, since the ￿ ow value of unemployment is the sub-
ject of such controversy, I vary it widely, using both 0.40 as favored by Shimer
(2005) and most of the literature and the higher values used by Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2005).
The main results are as follows: lower values of worker bargaining power
do succeed in bringing down the volatility of the wage, but at the cost of also
bringing down the volatility of consumption and investment to levels which are
too low compared to the data. Following Hagedorn and Manovskii￿ s strategy of
increasing the ￿ ow value of unemployment to extremely high levels does help
bring the labor market variables into line with the data, but the performance
of the model in accounting for the relative volatilities of the real variables con-
sumption and investment remains poorer than that of Shimer (2005).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model, and equi-
librium and the steady-state are found in section 3. Alternative calibration
strategies are discussed in section 4, while quantitative results are presented in
section 5 and section 6 concludes.
1 Model
This section presents the basic model. It is a standard neo-classical growth
model, augmented by labor market frictions and wage bargaining. The bargain-
ing setup involves ￿rms bargaining individually with each worker, and renego-
tiation of wages is possible at each date.
1.1 Household￿ s Problem
Each household consists of a number of individuals which is large enough to
guarantee perfect insurance over consumption. Each household member sup-
plies one unit of labor inelastically, and the household maximizes its discounted






3In contrast, in models with marginal product wages, it is well-known that CRS Cobb-
Douglas production under perfect competition leads to factor shares which are governed ex-
clusively by ￿.
4subject to the large-family budget and time constraints
htwt + ￿t + rtkt￿1 ￿ ct + it (2)
ht + ut = 1 (3)
where ht family members earn the wage wt and ut are unemployed, ￿t is a
share of ￿rms￿pro￿ts, rt is the return on capital and it is investment. Capital
accumulation follows the law of motion:
kt = (1 ￿ ￿)kt￿1 + it (4)
where ￿ is the rate of depreciation. The solution to the family￿ s problem takes
the form of an Euler equation:
uc (ct) = ￿Et fuc (ct+1)[1 ￿ ￿ + rt+1]g (5)
subject to the budget constraint
htwt + ￿t + (rt + 1 ￿ ￿)kt￿1 ￿ ct + kt (6)
1.2 Search and Matching in the Labor Market
The labor market is characterized by a standard search and matching frame-
work. Unemployed workers Ut and vacancies Vt are converted into matches by





labor market tightness as ￿t ￿ Vt
Ut, the ￿rm meets unemployed workers at rate
qt = s￿
￿￿
t , while the unemployed workers meet vacancies at rate ft = s￿
1￿￿
t .
Aggregate unemployment evolves as
Ut+1 = Ut + [1 ￿ ft ￿ ￿]Ut (7)
where ￿ is the exogenous match destruction rate.
Workers are identical and bargaining is individual. De￿ne e ￿t+1 ￿ ￿
uc(ct+1)
uc(ct)
to be the households￿stochastic discount factor. A worker￿ s value of employment
is:
V E




(1 ￿ ￿)V E
t+1 + ￿V U
t+1
￿o
The value of unemployment is standard.
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where b denotes some non-tradeable ￿ ow value to being unemployed, expressed
in units of output. De￿ning V W
t ￿ V E
t ￿V U
t yields an expression for the worker￿ s
surplus to employment:
V W






51.3 Firm￿ s Problem
There is a continuum of identical ￿rms on the unit interval. Firms are perfectly
competitive and produce using a constant returns to scale technology. We aban-
don the one-worker-per-￿rm assumption in favor of a more general framework
with multiple-worker ￿rms. In the absence of capital, the one-worker ￿rm as-
sumption would be harmless, since both individual and collective bargaining
would yield the same results. In the presence of installed capital, however, in-
dividual bargaining leads to a hold-up problem, while e¢ cient bargaining (i.e.
collective bargaining over both wages and employment) does not. Hence, it
is not possible to appeal to the welfare theorems to solve a planner￿ s problem
for the individual bargaining model, and its business cycle properties will di⁄er
from those of the planner￿ s problem.
Firms maximize the discounted value of future pro￿ts. Consistent with styl-
ized facts we assume that ￿rms adjust employment by varying the number of
workers [extensive margin] rather than the number of hours per worker. Firm
i￿ s state variable is the number of workers currently employed, h. The ￿rm￿ s
key decision is the number of vacancies v. Firms open as many vacancies as nec-
essary to hire in expectation the desired number of workers next period, while
taking into account that the real cost to opening a vacancy is ￿V . The ￿rm￿ s
problem becomes:
V J (zt;ht) = max
vt;kt
h
yt ￿ w(zt;ht;kt￿1)ht ￿ rtkt￿1 ￿ ￿V vt + Et
n
e ￿t+1V J (zt+1;ht+1)
oi
subject to




transition function: ht+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)ht + qtvt
wage curve : w(zt;ht;kt￿1)
technology shock: zt = ￿zt￿1 + "t
where the wage curve is the result of individual bargaining as described in the
following sub-section. When optimizing, ￿rms take into account the impact of
their capital and labor input choices on the bargained wage. In the following
sub-section, the bargained wage will indeed turn out to depend upon these input
choices.
The ￿rst-order condition for capital equates the marginal product of capital
to the cost of capital, where the latter includes both the rental cost per unit of







The ￿rst order condition for vacancies states that the marginal value of an










6Combining (11) with the envelope condition for employment ht leads to an


















Equation (12) equates the cost of hiring a worker (left hand side) to the dis-
counted expected marginal bene￿ts of hiring that worker. These marginal ben-
e￿ts are the worker￿ s marginal product net of wages, taking into account the
impact of hiring an additional worker on the bargained wage, and that a worker
will remain with the ￿rm with probability (1 ￿ ￿).
Finally, the envelope condition for employment ht and (11) also lead to an






￿ w(zt;ht;kt￿1) ￿ ht
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Equation (13) will be the ￿rm￿ s surplus when bargaining with each worker.
1.4 Individual Wage Bargaining
In this section I describe the wage bargaining. The key assumption of the
individual bargaining framework is that ￿rms cannot commit to long-term em-
ployment contracts, and may renegotiate wages with each worker at any time,
making each worker e⁄ectively the marginal worker.4 Hence, the ￿rm￿ s outside
option is not remaining idle, but rather producing with one worker less, so that
￿rm￿ s surplus is the marginal value of a worker. Also, individual bargaining
involves bargaining over wages only, since an individual worker can only deprive
the ￿rm of her own marginal product, which does not give the worker su¢ cient
leverage to negotiate hiring.
Individual bargaining is the appropriate bargaining setup when studying
the business cycle properties of the US economy for two further reasons. First,
"employment at will" is dominant in US labor markets, which are hence bet-
ter characterized by individual than by collective bargaining. Currently, less
than 10% of private sector workers are covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment, according to CPS data reported in Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). Sec-
ond, on theoretical grounds, individual bargaining is the natural extension of
the Mortensen-Pissarides framework to multi-worker ￿rms, because it ensures
that Nash-bargaining over wages is fully microfounded. In particular, Stole
and Zwiebel (1996) show that individual bargaining may be understood as a
Binmore-Rubinstein-Wolinsky (1986) alternating o⁄er game. Hence the wage
curve (18) can be obtained either by fully modeling the pairwise bargaining
structure, or by solving a standard generalized Nash bargaining problem.
4The individual bargaining framework was introduced by Stole and Zwiebel (1996, 1996a).
It has previously been applied to settings with decreasing returns to scale by Smith (1999), to
multiple worker types by Cahuc et. al. (2004) and to settings with monopolistic competition
in goods markets by Ebell and Haefke (2004, 2005).





t + (1 ￿ ￿)ln
@V J (zt;ht)
@ht
subject to ￿rm surplus (13) and worker￿ s surplus (9).5 Worker￿ s bargaining
power is given by ￿. The solution takes the form of a ￿rst-order linear di⁄erential













































1.5 Firm￿ s Problem Redux: The hold-up problem
As posited earlier, the bargained wage does turn out to depend upon the ￿rm￿ s
input choices. Di⁄erentiating (15) and substituting into (10) and (12) yields
optimality conditions for the ￿rm￿ s choices of labor and capital.
rt |{z}





































marginal product of labor
(17)
The ￿rm￿ s optimality conditions show that both the ￿rm￿ s choice of capital
and of labor inputs are distorted under individual bargaining. First, focus on the
￿rm￿ s choice of labor inputs. Firms ￿nd it optimal to hire workers beyond the
point at which their employment costs are covered by their marginal product.
The reason is that ￿ > 0 and constant returns to scale imply that the marginal
product of labor is decreasing. Since worker￿ s wages include a fraction ￿ of
their marginal product, this implies that increasing labor input ht depresses
the wage. Because each worker is treated as the marginal worker, increasing
5Due to the large family assumption, there is no feedback from the bargained wage to
current and future marginal utilities of consumption. Also, we can take V W
t+1 as constant, as
it will turn out to depend only on aggregate labor market tightness.
8ht decreases the wage for all workers, which Stole and Zwiebel (1996) term a
￿ hiring externality￿ .
In contrast, the ￿rm￿ s optimal choice of capital is lower than its e¢ cient
level, due to the presence of a hold-up e⁄ect.6 To see this note that ￿rms
optimally choose a capital stock which is lower than that that would equate
the marginal product of capital to its rental cost. The reason is that capital
is predetermined at the time of bargaining, having been installed one period
previously as is standard in RBC models. This implies that workers are able
to obtain a fraction of the rents to the capital through the wage bargaining,
decreasing the returns to capital obtained by the ￿rm. This causes ￿rms to
employ less capital than would be e¢ cient.7
The combination of underaccumulation of capital and overhiring of workers
leads to an ine¢ ciently low capital-labor ratio, given by:
kt￿1
ht






qt￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿V
qt
rt | {z }
e¢ cient capital-labor ratio
Hence, the higher is worker￿ s bargaining power, the greater is the deviation of
the capital-labor ratio from its e¢ cient level.












+ (1 ￿ ￿)b (18)
1.6 Free Entry
Under free entry, the net value of starting a ￿rm is zero. A ￿rm founded at date
t has no workers and hence does not produce in its initial period. It does post
enough vacancies v0;t to hire the desired workforce at t+1. The ￿rm￿ s problem
in its initial period is:
V J (0;zt) = max
v0;t
h
￿￿V v0;t + Et
n
e ￿t+1V J (zt+1;ht+1)
oi
subject to
initial hiring: ht+1 = qtv0;t









which is identical to the ￿rst order condition for vacancies at later dates given
by equation (11). Since the net pro￿ts of all ￿rms are zero, aggregate pro￿ts
are also zero.
6This hold-up e⁄ect is also described in Cahuc et. al. (2004). These authors, however,
concentrate exclusively on the steady state and do not examine the cyclical implications of
the ine¢ cient capital and hiring decisions.
7Note that the ￿rm chooses e¢ cient labor and capital inputs when ￿ = 0 so that worker￿ s
bargaining power is zero or when ￿ = 0, so that no capital is used in production.
92 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is de￿ned as sequences of prices and labor market tightnesses
which solve the ￿rm￿ s, the household￿ s and the bargaining problem and which
let markets clear. The equilibrium is a tuple (wt;rt;￿t) which satis￿es the house-
hold￿ s Euler equation (5) and the budget constraint (6), the ￿rm￿ s optimality
conditions (16) and (17), the wage curve (18), free entry ￿t = ￿t = 0, the
transition equation for aggregate unemployment (7), and in which all markets
clear.
This de￿nition of equilibrium yields a system of eight equations in the eight
unknowns (yt;￿t;ht;kt￿1;wt;Rt;ct;zt). All equilibrium equations are listed in
the appendix.
3 Calibration
The period length is one month. There are nine parameters to pin down: va-
cancy costs ￿V , worker￿ s bargaining power ￿, the output elasticity of capital ￿,
the ￿ ow value of unemployment b, the depreciation rate ￿, the match destruction
rate ￿, the technology parameter A, the matching elasticity ￿ and the matching
scale parameter s. I follow Shimer (2005) in setting the exogenous separation
rate ￿ to 0:034 and the job-￿nding rate ft to 0.45, both based on their values in
the data. I set the match elasticity of unemployment to be 0.5, as is standard
in the literature and in line with the estimates in the range (0.5,0.7) reported in
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2003).8 The job ￿nding rate qt is set so that vacancy
duration is 1.5 months, as reported in Ridder and van Ours (1991). The choices
of vacancy duration and job-￿nding rate lead to a value for steady-state labor
market tightness ￿ =
ft
qt = 0:68 and hence pin down the scale parameter of the
matching function as s =
ft
￿1￿￿ = 0:55.
The steady-state capital share ￿ is determined by the steady-state versions
of (16) and (17) as:
capital share =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + 1 ￿ ￿
There is a continuum of pairs (￿;￿) which lead to the target capital share of
0.36, which satisfy 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and 0:36 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. I examine two alternative
calibration strategies for pinning down the (￿;￿) pair. First, note that the ratio
of TFP to labor productivity growth along a balanced growth path must equal
1 ￿ ￿. Wol⁄ (1991) ￿nds this ratio to be 0.59 in post-war data (and 0.60 in a
longer data set covering 1880-1979), pinning down ￿ at 0.41. This pins down the
worker￿ s bargaining power at ￿ = 0:19, the value necessary to obtain a capital
share of 0.36.
Alternatively, one can use the capital-labor ratio to pin down ￿ and ￿. Again,
note that the ratio of TFP to capital-labor ratio growth along a balanced growth
8I also examine calibrations with alternative values of matching elasticity of ￿ = 0:72 and
￿ = 0:19.
10path is 1￿￿. Wol⁄ (1991) reports average post-war TFP growth of 1.36% and
average capital-labor growth rate of 2.44% over the same period, corresponding
to a value of ￿ = 0:44 and hence ￿ must be 0.28 to achieve the targeted capital
income share. Using the average growth rates of TFP and capital-labor ratio
over the period 1880-1979 yields an ￿ of 0.40 and a worker￿ s bargaining power
of ￿ = 0:16. Hence, both calibration strategies yield relatively low values of
worker￿ s bargaining power, which are intermediate between those commonly
used in the literature (between 0.40 and 0.72), and the very low values used by
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005), who set ￿ = 0:06.9
The remaining parameter values are standard. The monthly depreciation
rate of ￿ = 0:007 corresponds to a quarterly rate of 0:022. The monthly discount
factor ￿ is chosen as 0.997 to yield a steady-state return to capital of 4.0 %
annually. The technology parameter is normalized so that steady-state output
is unitary.
The ￿nal free parameter is b, the ￿ ow value of unemployment. Since this
parameter has been the source of some amount of controversy, I examine the
business cycle properties of the individual bargaining model for two values of b 2
f0:40;0:64g, corresponding to replacement rates of 0.65 and 0.94 respectively.
4 Results
I run ￿ve experiments, summarized in Table 1. Experiment I replicates as closely
as possible Shimer (2005)￿ s calibration, choosing ￿ = ￿ = 0:72 and b = 0:40.
Experiment II sets worker￿ s bargaining power ￿ to 0:19, as described above,
while allowing matching elasticity ￿ to take its standard value of 0.50, while
keeping b at its standard value of 0.40. Experiment III repeats Experiment II
but with the high value of b. Experiments IV and V set ￿ to 0.19, and impose
the Hosios condition to obtain matching elasticity ￿ = 0:19.
Table 2 gives the volatilities of key variables as fractions of the volatility
of the technology shock. The results of experiment I are (not surprisingly)
similar to those of Shimer (2005): unemployment, vacancies and tightness are
not volatile enough, while wages are too volatile. In addition, we see that the
calibrated model of experiment I generates consumption and investment paths
that are considerably less volatile than the data. Experiment II reduces the
bargaining power of workers to ￿ = 0:19 and match elasticity to ￿ = 0:50. This
actually worsens the performance of the model along all dimensions except wage
volatility, which decreases to be more closely aligned with the data.
Experiment III replicates the calibration strategy of Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2005). In a model with capital, the ability of a high replacement rate to match
the volatilities of vacancies, unemployment and tightness is dampened quite
substantially. More worryingly, although low values of bargaining power ￿ in
conjunction with high values of b do improve the performance of the model with
9Also note that in our setting, ￿ is the percent deviation of the steady-state capital-labor
ratio from its e¢ cient level. Very high values for ￿ would imply very large deviations from
e¢ cient capital-labor ratios.
11respect to the volatilities of the labor market variables w, u, v and ￿, they ac-
tually worsen the performance of the model in matching the volatilities of the
real variables consumption and investment.
Experiment IV and V repeat experiments II and III when the value of the
matching elasticity ￿ is chosen at 0.19 to satisfy the Hosios condition. Overall,
experiment V performs best in accounting for the behavior of both the labor
market and the real variables. However, experiment V relies on matching elas-
ticities that are considerably lower than those measured in the data.
In progress: elastic labor supply, non-linear vacancy-posting costs.
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125 Appendix
5.1 Solving the Di⁄erential Equation for the Bargained
Wage
Begin by noting that one can disregard the constant terms (those terms which
do not depend on ht) when solving (14), and simply add them back in later.



















￿ (1 ￿ ￿)eztAk￿
t￿1h
￿￿￿1
t = 0 (20)




























Substitute (22) and (23) back into (20):
@K
@h











































Finally, need to pin down J using a terminal condition. Following Cahuc, et. al.
(2004), choose the condition that limht!0 htwt = 0, that is, the ￿rm-level wage
should not explode as ￿rm-level employment ht approaches zero. This implies
that J = 0. Adding back in the constant term yields (15).
























































+ ￿￿V ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)b (31)
ht = (1 ￿ ht￿1)s￿
1￿￿
t￿1 + ht￿1 (1 ￿ ￿) (32)
zt = ￿zt￿1 + "t+1 where E ("t+1) = 0 (33)
5.3 Steady-state
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(e r + ￿)
￿ Consumption
c = wh + (r ￿ ￿)k
5.4 Log-linearized System of Di⁄erence Equations
De￿ne Rt = rt + 1 ￿ ￿:
Et
n
￿b ct ￿ ￿b ct+1 + b Rt+1
o
= 0 (35)
￿ cb ct + hw
￿




b Rt + b kt￿1
￿
￿ kb kt = 0 (36)
b yt ￿ zt ￿ ￿b kt￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b ht = 0 (37)



















zt+1 + ￿b kt ￿ ￿b ht+1
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+(1 ￿ ￿) ￿V
q ￿b ￿t+1 ￿ ￿V
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b yt ￿ b ht
￿
+ ￿￿V ￿b ￿t = 0 (40)







1 ￿ ￿ ￿ s￿
1￿￿￿
hb ht￿1 (41)
zt = ￿zt￿1 + "t+1 (42)
6 Tables
Table I: Parameter Values for Experiments
I II III IV V
￿ 0.72 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
b 0.40 0.40 0.64 0.40 0.64
￿ 0.72 0.50 0.50 0.19 0.19
15Table II: Relative Volatilities
I II III IV V data
￿ 2.0 1.8 8.9 2.4 10.6 19.1
v 1.7 1.3 6.4 1.5 6.8 9.5
u 0.5 0.8 3.7 1.6 7.1 10.1
w 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.4
c 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7
i 3.6 3.0 3.4 3.4 4.2 4.8
Values in the table are the ratio of the volatility of variable x to the
volatility of the technology shock. Data values for ￿, v and u are taken
from Shimer (2005), while data values for w, c and i come from Cooley
and Prescott (1995). Note that the real data gives volatilities relative to
output volatility.
16